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country lagging farthest behind in terms of economic dynamics. Most researchers blame 
rising wages, welfare costs, and overregulated labour markets for this poor position. Some 
add that as a result of membership in the European Monetary Union, Germany lost the 
advantage of having low interest rates. To a certain extent, all view German unification as a 
prime culprit. This article acknowledges that although these factors have contributed to the 
recent underperformance of Germany, another major reason has been overlooked. A 
problem was brewing in Germany long before unification, namely the danger of being a high 
wage country specialised in medium technologies. We show that Germany neither increased 
its investment into research and education, nor did it embrace ICT technology. Germany lost 
its position as the European leader in research expenditures relative to GDP. For a set of 16 
growth drivers, the dynamics of investment into research, education and information 
technology during the nineties were the slowest of all EU countries, and according to a 
quantitative indicator of "total investment into the future" Germany ranked second to last. 
Investment into future growth is specifically crucial when costs are high and markets are 
strictly regulated. Comparing the three potential reasons for low growth, namely 
underinvestment into growth drivers, rising costs and strict regulation, we find the first one to 
be the most important growth blocker and the least acknowledged in the German debate. 
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Insufficient investment into future growth: the 
forgotten cause of low growth in Germany 
Karl Aiginger 
1.  Introduction and plan of the paper 
The nineties were a disappointing decade for Germany. Economic growth decelerated to 
1.3%, the lowest growth rate in all of the European Union. Productivity decelerated, 
unemployment climbed upwards, budget deficits soared and exceeded the maximum 
allowed for by the Stability and Growth Pact. Macroeconomic growth also decelerated in 
France and Italy, but not to the same extent. Without these three big continental countries, 
growth in Europe would have amounted to 2.8% (EU without big 3c), not too far from that of 
the US (3.2%). 
Most studies blame expensive labour, high welfare costs and low market flexibility for the 
underperformance of Germany. A short and pointed summary of this line of reasoning is 
provided by Sinn (2002A, 2002B, 2003).1 After describing Germany’s loss in GDP versus its EU 
partners, and the declining share of German exports in the world economy, Sinn enumerates 
internal and external causes in the following order: 
•  "The increase in wages and labour-related expenses is the most important factor." 
•  "The expansion of the welfare state contributed significantly to the rise in labour costs." 
•  "German unification also explains part of weak economic growth." 
•  "The intensification of competition following the fall of the Iron Curtain and European 
Integration" 
•  "The Euro in particular led...to a dramatic convergence in interest rates....The Euro has 
robbed German industry of its competitive advantage in the form of lower interest rates." 
•  "In order to speed up growth again, market forces, especially on the labour market, must 
be activated...collective bargaining and labour law must be fundamentally reformed." 
Insufficient expenditures on research, the slow diffusion of information and communication 
technology or a comparative disadvantage in new technologies is not included in the list of 
growth blockers. The closest Sinn comes to mentioning these growth drivers is at the end of 
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the summary, in the form of a hint at the role of education: "Last but not least, education must 
be improved to lay the long term foundation for a new surge in innovation. This is widely 
accepted, but it will not be enough ... economic growth will continue to lag ... unless the 
more difficult reforms are implemented, too." 
Sinn's analysis is the most precise enumeration of the usual suspects for German problems and 
the bluntest neglect of any contribution made by research, innovation, and technology to 
the medium-term growth rate of Germany. Other studies essentially take the same position, 
but at least report deficiencies in the innovation system or the technological position. 
The European Commission (2002) analyses the growth differential of Germany with respect to 
other countries and the vulnerability of Germany to external shocks (Mexican and Asian crisis 
and oil shock of 1999/2000). It refers to the long-lasting effects of re-unification, with its 
artificial exchange rate, the boom and bust of the construction sector and weak 
consumption demand. Digging deeper into determinants, the Commission specifies the 4% 
transfer of GDP from the west to the east. This extra burden caused rising taxes and social 
expenditures and strongly declining cost competitiveness in the first half of the nineties 
(European Commission, 2002); this loss has, "thanks to wage restraint and the weak Euro .... 
been largely restored in the West, but not for the Neue Länder. Macroeconomic policy is not 
responsible, even if Germany has not profited as much as other countries from falling interest 
rates, the labour market has seen a more subdued development in Germany with rigidities on 
the labour market standing out as a key factor." The Commission then singles out the 
following characteristics of the labour market which impede higher employment: (i) wages 
out of line with productivity...especially for the unskilled segment, (ii) high marginal tax rates in 
combination with long benefit duration and high benefit rates (for certain groups); (iii) a 
general lack of flexibility and mobility. Since labour market regulation is not much higher than 
in other countries – as the report has to acknowledge - the problem lies in the harmful signals 
sent by the reversals of timid reforms. Furthermore, existing rigidities gained relevance through 
their interaction with unification related forces. In a following analysis of trade and the current 
account deficit, the study concludes that although one cannot speak about a 
competitiveness problem, it does acknowledge the insufficient presence of German exports 
in dynamic markets and that Germany’s "high-technology sector perhaps surprisingly shows a 
slight and growing comparative disadvantage ... " (European Commission, 2002, p. 70 and 
Figure 3.7). The Commission Report is thus more balanced, as it at least mentions the 
technology gap. However, there is no connection between this analysis and policy measures, 
and the technology gap is not mentioned again in the summary. There is a deplorable 
discrepancy between the interpretation of Germany’s growth performance in the past, 
where investment into research, education and new technologies plays no role at all, and 
the Lisbon strategy, which sets a 3% goal for growth, and acknowledges the crucial roles of 
research and education. 2 
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The OECD Country Report for Germany blames low levels of employment creation as the 
main reason for slow growth (OECD, 2003, p. 27), followed by low productivity and insufficient 
demand. Reference is made to the education system in light of its high costs, long duration of 
studies and low Pisa ratings for language and mathematical skills. Telecom is analysed with 
respect to its potential for decreasing prices, while research is not mentioned at all. The boom 
and the bust of the construction sector contributed to the deceleration of growth rates 
between the first and second halves of the nineties. It stresses the influence of German 
unification, but cannot explain the weak performance of the most recent years. Wurzel (2001) 
stresses the ageing problem as a factor which specifically limits employment creation. 









Top 3 countries 2.9 2.3
EU 2.1 2.0
EU excl. Large 3 c 2.8 2.4
US 3.2 2.2  
Source: WIFO calculations using AMECO. 
This paper is organised as follows. First we describe German performance in the nineties using 
a set of macroeconomic indicators regarding growth, stability and fiscal prudence (Section 
2). Specifically, we compare Germany with the EU average, but also with France and Italy. 
We contrast the positions of these countries with the best performing European countries. 
Then, we compare cost development in Germany with that in the EU, referring to labour 
costs, as well as to social costs and taxes (Section 3). Section 4 analyses regulation in product 
and labour markets and regulatory change in Germany relative to other countries. In Section 
5, we investigate the dynamics of German investment into "growth drivers", specifically how 
the German position has changed over the nineties. Finally, we recall studies prior to German 
unification, which warned about the effects of a high tech gap in a high wage country and 
discuss why most analyses do not focus on insufficient investment into the long-run 
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... especially for small and medium sized firms. –  5  – 
    
determinants of growth as important cause for German problems (Section 6). Section 7 
presents our conclusions. 
2.  Germany at the bottom end of the European performance league 
Measuring the performance, welfare or the competitiveness of countries has been the 
subject of intensive and controversial discussion, culminating in the question whether these 
notions exist at an aggregate level or for a country. We pragmatically decided to measure 
economic performance according to the dynamics of GDP, as well as in light of a country’s 
ability to increase productivity and employment and to provide economic stability. The set of 
indicators includes data on manufacturing; it reports on indicators of growth rates 
acceleration and starting levels. Employment performance is measured by unemployment 
and employment rates (levels and changes), stability by the inflation rate and fiscal 
prudence (deficits, debts, and taxes). The period we chose encompasses the last 10 years up 
to 2002. The quantitative results for 25 indicators, as well as rankings for Germany and the 
other big economies are listed in Table 2. Changing the number of indicators, their weights 
and the timing does influence a few positions, the overall ranking is generally stable. 
Germany’s average rank over the 25 performance indicators is 10.8; this is the lowest rank of 
all 14 countries included in the comparison. Germany has the lowest rate of output growth, 
the lowest level of total factor productivity, and the strongest deceleration in industry growth, 
potential output and total factor productivity. The best position achieved by Germany is in 
inflation (4th  place), although even here, Germany’s performance is surpassed by France, 
Finland and Sweden. Medium ranks are achieved for productivity growth in manufacturing, 
per capita GDP and the employment rate (average of the past ten years). 
Within the EU, Italy and France are "neighbours", as far as their weak performances are 
concerned. Italy places last in productivity and growth in potential output, and also exhibits 
the strongest deceleration in productivity. In France, the budget deficit has increased 
strongly, with public debt soaring from 40% to 60% of GDP. Italy excelled only in reducing 
inflation and its budget deficit. The countries ranked at the top are Ireland, Finland, Denmark 
and Sweden, of which the latter three will henceforth be called the top 3 countries (following 
Aiginger, 2003). In contrast, Germany, France and Italy are the big 3 countries, or more 
accurately, the big three continental countries (big 3c). They all had practically the same per 
capita income at purchasing power parity in 2002. 
In summary, over the past ten years, the big 3 continental countries attained an average rate 
of growth of 1.6%, as compared to 2.9% for the top 3 countries. Within the big 3, Germany 
lags behind with a growth rate of 1.3%. For manufacturing, growth in the top countries is triple 
that of the large countries, while Germany’s is slightly lower even if compared to the large 
country group (1.2%). The productivity difference is half a point for the total economy, and 
one and a half points for manufacturing. In per capita income, the top 3 countries (25,300 –  6  – 
    
EURO) surpass the big 3 countries (24,500 EURO), with Germany exactly in the mean of the big 
3c. 
Table 2: Ranking the economic performance of Germany for a set of 25 indicators 
Large 3 Top 3 EU
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank
Real growth of GDP
    Growth 1993/2002 1.3 14 1.9 12 1.6 13 1.6 2.5 9 3.3 2 2.9 3 2.9 2.1
    Acceleration
*
-1.8 14 -0.4 10 -0.7 11 -1.0 0.8 5 1.7 2 1.1 4 1.2 -0.5
Macro productivity growth
    Growth 1993/2002 1.1 13 1.3 11 1.3 10 1.2 1.8 6 2.5 3 2.7 2 2.4 1.4
    Acceleration
*
-1.2 13 -0.9 12 -0.4 7 -0.8 0.5 3 -0.1 6 1.0 2 0.5 -0.6
Manufacturing growth
    Growth 1993/2002 1 . 2 1 31 . 8 81 . 4 1 2 1 . 4 3 . 2 56 . 1 23 . 8 4 4 . 4 1 . 7
    Acceleration
*
-1.4 14 0.3 8 -0.9 12 -0.7 0.5 7 4.5 2 1.6 3 2.2 -1.1
Productivity growth in manufacturing
    Growth 1993/2002 3.2 8 0.6 13 -0.2 14 1.2 3.4 6 7.2 2 2.8 10 4.5 2.7
    Acceleration
*
0.3 7 -0.9 10 -3.3 14 -1.3 0.8 5 4.7 2 -2.8 13 0.9 0.1
Potential output
    Growth 1993/2002 1.7 13 2.0 12 1.6 14 1.8 2.2 9 2.7 5 2.4 8 2.4 2.2
    Acceleration
*
-0.7 14 -0.1 10 -0.6 13 -0.5 0.6 3 0.5 4 0.4 5 0.5 -0.2
Total Factor Productivity
    Growth 1993/2002 0.4 14 0.9 8 0.8 9 0.7 1.6 5 2.7 2 2.4 3 2.2 0.9
    Acceleration
*
-1.4 14 -0.4 9 -0.3 7 -0.7 0.6 5 1.3 3 1.4 1 1.1 -0.5
Employment rate
    Average 1993-2002 67.7 7 61.1 9 56.8 12 61.9 76.2 1 63.2 8 73.2 3 70.8 64.4
    Absolute change 1993-2002 0.6 12 3.3 5 1.9 9 2.0 2.9 7 3.1 6 -2.3 14 1.2 3.0
Unemployment rate
    Average 1993-2002 8.4 7 10.7 11 10.8 12 9.9 5.8 4 12.5 13 7.7 6 8.7 9.2
    Absolute change 1993/2002 1.8 13 -1.3 7 0.3 10 0.3 -4.1 3 -2.6 5 -0.7 8 -2.5 -1.0
Inflation rate
    Average 1993-2002 1.9 4 1.5 1 3.1 11 2.2 2.2 7 1.6 2 1.6 3 1.8 2.4
    Absolute change 1993/2002 -2.6 4 -0.5 10 -2.7 3 -1.9 0.3 12 -1.4 8 0.1 11 -0.3 -2.1
Budget deficit in % of GDP
    2002 3.3 13 3.4 14 2.3 11 3.0 -1.8 2 -4.4 1 -0.8 3 -2.3 2.0
    Absolute change 1993/2002 -1.1 13 -1.4 12 -8.6 2 -3.7 -2.4 10 -6.1 5 -6.4 4 -5.0 -3.9
Public debt in % of GDP
    2002 60.8 13 59.5 14 106.7 6 75.7 45.2 4 42.7 8 52.4 5 46.8 62.7
    Absolute change 1993/2002 17.9 13 20.0 14 -1.0 6 12.3 -21.1 4 2.1 8 -10.7 5 -9.9 3.7
Taxes in % of GDP
    2002 45.3 7 50.6 10 45.2 6 47.0 57.1 13 53.7 12 59.1 14 56.6 45.5
    Absolute change 1993/2002 1.4 10 2.3 11 -0.6 9 1.0 -0.8 8 -7.3 2 -5.4 3 -4.5 -0.1
GDP per capita at PPP 2002
    1000 EURO 24.6 7 24.5 9 24.5 8 24.5 27.2 2 24.4 10 24.3 11 25.3 23.9
Overall average of ranks 10.8 9.8 10.0 5.8 4.7 5.9
Rank of this average 14 12 13 3 2 4
Finland Sweden Germany France Italy Denmark
 
* Acceleration: growth p.a. 1993/2002 minus growth p.a. 1983/1992; 14 EU countries (excl. Luxembourg). 
Source: WIFO calculations using AMECO. –  7  – 
    
Figure 1: Macroeconomic performance of Germany 
GDP real (1990=100) GDP per worker (1990=100)
Potential output (1990=100) Multi factor productivity growth





























































3.  Cost competitiveness indicators for Germany 
In this section we examine indicators of cost competitiveness, which can help us determine 
the extent to which rising costs could be the cause of German underperformance. 
Germany is a high wage country, with the highest per worker and per hour wages in all of 
European manufacturing. Wages per hour are 25% higher than the European average, 30% 
higher than in France and 53% higher than in Italy (Guger, 2003). 
Looking at wage increases over time, we see a steep rise in wages between 1990 and 1995 
(see Figure 2, first row). During this period, the German economy achieved a comfortable –  8  – 
    
rate of growth, today labelled the temporary "unification boom". Construction boomed, 
wages converged between the "Alte" and "Neue Länder", and benefits were extended. The 
boom, as well as the dynamic rise in wages subdued sometime around 1995, and since then 
wages and unit labour costs have increased slowly. The wage moderation was so strong that 
wages and unit labour costs3 for the decade as a whole developed more slowly than the 
European average. 
Taxes in relation to GDP soared between 1990 and 1994; since then, there has been no clear 
trend. The German tax rate has been close to the European average for a long time; during 
the eighties, it was a little bit below the EU average, while the largest "advantage" was in 1991 
(2.2 points). Although this low tax status was lost after unification, current taxes are still quite 
near to the European average (see Figure 2, last row). Thus, taxes have contributed to 
increasing costs. This means a former advantage has been lost, but not to the extent of 
creating an additional absolute burden in 2000. 
In 1990, social expenditures amounted to 25% of GDP in Germany, as well as in the European 
Union as a whole (Figure 3); less than in the Scandinavian countries, but higher than in 
southern countries. The extension of benefits to the "Neue Länder" and high unemployment 
stepped up the burden to 29%, which is now 3 percentage points more than the European 
average, but is less than in France (29.5%) and in the top 3 countries (31%). A certain 
proportion of the higher expenditures may have been compensated by reductions in other 
expenditures, but the lions share is reflected in the changing budget position. Government 
expenditures increased from 46% to 50% of GDP, exactly parallel to social expenditures. 
                                                       
3 Source for wages and unit labour costs AMECO (in common currency, nominal in EURO). –  9  – 
    
Figure 2: Cost competitiveness, taxes, expenditures and debt 
Wages (1990=100) Unit labour costs
Currency/EURO (decrease = devaluation) Government expenditures in % of GDP































































In short, labour costs have not increased faster than the European average over the past ten 
years. They did increase fast in the first half of the nineties, but this was corrected in the 
second half. Of course, price competitiveness could have been higher in the first half of the 
nineties and high wage increases may have depressed profits and prevented investment 
and research. But this does not provide very convincing support for the claim that wage 
increases have caused slow growth over the course of the entire decade and specifically the 
last eight years since 19954. Social expenditures increased, but this was reflected only in part 
by higher taxes: taxes increased somewhat during the first half, thus eliminating the former tax 
                                                       
4 For a similar evaluation, see European Commission (2002, p.2), which reports that price competitiveness was lost in 
the first half, but regained during the second, due to wage moderation and the weak EURO. This finding is restricted 
to West Germany, and does not apply to the "Neue Länder". –  10  – 
    
advantage. The greatest share of the unification costs or the increased social expenditures 
was shifted into the government deficit. This of course has indirect effects on competitiveness, 
firstly via expectations of further tax burdens and secondly through the crowding out of other 
expenditure categories. 






1980 1985 1990 1995
Germany France Italy EU average
 
Source: OECD. 
4.  Regulation in product and labour markets  
In this section we analyse the extent of regulation and regulatory change for product and 
labour markets. An international comparison of institutions is extremely difficult. We use a 
widely known set of indicators provided by the OECD to assess the German situation. 
Product markets are definitely less regulated in Germany than in the European Union as a 
whole; this was the case at the start of the nineties, and since then liberalisation has been 
stronger than in the European Union. –  11  – 
    
Figure 4: Regulation and regulatory change 
Product market regulation: Static indicator (PMRSTAT)
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Source: OECD Database on Regulatory Indicators. 
One indicator of product market regulation is available only for 1998; it is therefore called the 
static indicator (PMRSTAT). Here, Germany ranks 1.4, with lower ranks indicating less 
regulation. Regulation is definitely lower than in France (2.1) or Italy (2.3), and below the 
European average, since trade is unrestricted, government ownership is low and competition 
policy is tough. The other indicator on product market regulation primarily describes 
liberalisation in network industries and is available over time (PMRDYN). It reveals that in 1990, –  12  – 
    
network industries in Germany were already more liberalised than the EU average (4.13 vs. 
4.73), as well as that the further decline was steeper (-37% vs. -31%). Again, the main contrast 
is vis-à-vis France and Italy. By any measure, Germany is thus among the most liberalised 
economies with respect to product markets. In the liberalisation of network industries in 1998, 
Germany shares 3rd place with Finland, preceded only by the United Kingdom and Sweden. 
The opposite is true for labour markets. Labour market regulation was strong in 1990, with a 
rank of 3.6 for Germany versus 2.9 for the European Union. Deregulation was slightly stronger - 
the index dropped by 22% for Germany and by 15% for the EU average; in absolute terms the 
difference to the European Union narrowed from 0.7 to 0.4 percentage points. Labour 
markets are more regulated in France, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain; thus Germany is 
playing in the "Southern League" as far as labour market regulation is concerned. Germany 
did not deregulate regular contracts at all (the index reveals a slight increase for Germany, 
while it decreased for European countries). However Germany did deregulate temporary 
contracts. These were strongly regulated in 1990 (jointly with Italy and Greece), and the index 
dropped from 4.4 to 2.6. Temporary contracts are now only slightly more regulated than in 
the average of other European countries. 
Summarising our findings, product markets are efficient in Germany. Labour markets are more 
regulated, specifically for regular contracts. The extent of deregulation is greater for 
temporary contracts; this has also diminished the difference in overall labour market 
regulation between Germany and other EU members, while upholding the characterisation 
of Germany as a labour market with above average regulation. Making labour markets solely 
responsible for underperformance is not easy, since Germany enjoyed high growth during 
past decades with a greater extent of "overregulation". It is however likely that rigid labour 
markets are more important in times of turbulence and rapid technological change. Rigidities 
may also play a larger role in countries with extremely high wages and pressing structural 
change. We need these secondary arguments to underline the importance of labour market 
deregulation.5 
5.  The dynamics of investment into future growth (growth drivers) 
It is well understood that the competitive advantages of countries change with their 
resources and the relative prices of inputs. High wage countries switch first to capital-intensive 
production and later to production which is intensive in human capital and research. In low-
income countries, economic growth depends on resources; as per capita income increases, 
physical capital and ultimately research, education and the speed of innovation play 
                                                       
5  This assessment is similar to that of the EU Commission (2002), which reports that Germany was not an outlier in 
labour market regulation. However, it blames Germany for sending the wrong signals by reversing timid reforms. 
Secondly, the report states that regulation may have a negative impact when it interacts with unification. The 
amount of change induced  by German unification may have needed more flexible institutions. –  13  – 
    
increasingly important roles. As the EU-member country with the highest wages, growth 
theory predicts that Germany will achieve economic growth if it excels in R&D, education 
and new technologies. We examine the German position first according to a set of 16 
indicators of research input and output, educational attainment of the work force, ICT 
expenditures and use, and finally the share of sophisticated industries. Then, we calculate an 
indicator of total investment into the future by summing up the shares of R&D, education and 
ICT expenditures relative to GDP. Our analysis focuses first on the position of Germany versus 
other countries in levels, then on the change in Germany's position over time. 
Table 3: Germany’s  position for 16 growth drivers    
1990 Rank 2000 Rank Absolute 
change 
2000/1990
Rank 1990 2000 1990 2000
Indicators on R&D: input and output
Total expenditure on R&D in % of GDP 2.75 2 2.44 3 -0.31 10 1.60 1.85 + +
Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D (BERD) in % of GDP 1.66 2 1.55 3 -0.11 11 0.99 1.12 + +
Research  intensity in manufacturing 2.52 3 2.52 3 0.00 6 2.25 2.39 + +
Publications per inhabitant 6.01 8 7.84 9 1.83 10 6.56 8.97 - -
Patents per resident 4.89 1 5.50 1 0.61 2 2.20 2.28 + +
Indicators on education system: input and output
Percentage of the population that has attained
at least upper secondary education by age group (1998) 84.00 1 84.00 1 0.00 13 57.86 52.50 + +
Percentage of the population that has attained
at least tertiary education, by age group (1998) 23.00 7 25.00 4 2.00 13 20.36 18.79 + +
Indicators on ICT: production and use
ICT expenditure in % of GDP 4.21 5 5.32 12 1.11 13 3.69 6.00 + -
Information technology (IT) expenditure in % of GDP 2.12 4 2.59 7 0.47 11 1.69 2.57 + +
Telecommunication (TLC) expenditure in % of GDP 2.09 7 2.73 13 0.64 13 2.00 3.43 + -
PCs per 1000 inhabitant 1086.8 8 2969.7 8 1882.93 7 975.1 2748.6 + +
Internet users per 1000 inhabitant 43.2 5 1752.6 8 1709.38 8 49.0 1929.9 - -
Cellular Mobile Subscribers per 100 capita 1.2 8 28.4 14 27.14 14 2.2 44.4 - -
Indicators on share of "progressive" industries
Share of technology driven industries in nominal value added 24.99 2 26.41 4 1.42 11 17.24 19.56 + +
Share of skill intensive industries in nominal value added 19.63 2 19.22 3 -0.40 9 14.18 14.55 + +
Share of ICT industries in nominal value added 6.28 7 4.95 10 -1.34 12 6.60 7.25 - -
Overall average of ranks 4.3 6.6 10.2
Rank of this average 361 4
Germany Germany vs. EU EU
 
Let us start with research. In 1980, Germany had the highest ratio of R&D expenditures relative 
to GDP in Europe. Its position at the start of the nineties was the 2nd best in Europe (2.8%); it fell 
to 4th place in the mid nineties (2.3%) and recovered slightly to 2.5% in 2000 (3rdplace, see 
Table 3). Sweden and Finland are now leading, with 3.8% and 3.4% respectively. Of the 
European countries, only four others had declining ratios.6  Other indicators of research inputs 
(in manufacturing and the business sector) also reveal high, but stagnant or slightly declining 
research outlays. With regard to patents per resident, Germany maintained its leading 
position, for publications it fell back from rank 8 to rank 9. 
Expenditures on education in relation to GDP are below the European average and have 
decreased from 4.8% to 4.6% of GDP. Expenditures on education are far higher and rising 
slightly in the top 3 countries (from 7.3% to 7.5%). The share of workers with secondary 
                                                       
6 The decline does not seem to be due to the inclusion of East German Länder in the statistics. Research ratios in the 
Eastern Länder are not much lower than those in West Germany (even if productivity may be lower), and they have 
been increasing since statistics have been available (European Commission, Box 3), DIW (2000), p. 283. –  14  – 
    
educations is high; tertiary education and scientists have small shares. Germany performed 
weakly in the so called PISA evaluation of mathematical and language skills. 
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Table 4: "Total investment into future growth" in % of GDP (R&D + education + ICT) 






Belgium 10.60 11.06 10.97 10.92 11.33 11.71 12.04 12.87 12.91 9 21.8 8
Denmark 13.62 14.11 14.13 14.49 15.15 15.40 15.88 16.09 16.59 2 21.8 7
Germany 11.32 11.54 11.44 11.26 11.24 11.49 11.97 12.36 12.79 10 13.0 13
Greece 6.01 6.52 7.04 7.09 7.50 7.91 8.93 9.86 10.55 14 75.5 1
Spain 7.98 8.66 8.64 8.90 9.22 10.32 10.92 11.59 12.16 11 52.4 2
France 12.20 12.49 12.45 12.66 12.70 13.04 13.32 13.79 14.17 4 16.1 12
Ireland 10.94 11.83 11.58 11.85 11.94 11.91 11.42 10.79 10.89 13 -0.5 14
Italy 8.42 9.70 9.52 9.89 9.88 9.81 10.35 10.75 11.30 12 34.2 5
Netherlands 11.54 12.15 12.06 12.08 12.46 12.69 12.94 13.38 13.76 5 19.2 10
Austria 11.17 11.55 11.66 11.38 11.47 12.02 12.46 13.17 13.39 8 19.9 9
Portugal 9.20 10.06 10.34 10.35 10.55 11.61 12.44 12.88 13.46 7 46.3 3
Finland 12.68 13.98 13.49 13.87 14.51 14.76 14.92 15.71 15.70 3 23.8 6
Sweden 14.55 16.57 16.69 16.84 17.19 18.06 19.08 19.31 19.75 1 35.7 4
United Kingdom 11.54 12.48 12.44 12.68 12.73 12.88 12.78 13.09 13.66 6 18.4 11
EU 10.77 11.40 11.37 11.52 11.72 12.08 12.37 12.86 13.28 23.2
Japan 10.35 9.74 9.76 10.44 10.86 12.04 12.48 12.63 13.12 26.8
USA 13.20 13.05 12.66 14.17 14.76 16.06 16.08 16.55 16.35 23.9
Top 3 13.62 14.89 14.77 15.07 15.62 16.07 16.63 17.04 17.35 27.4
Large 3 10.65 11.24 11.14 11.27 11.27 11.45 11.88 12.30 12.75 19.8  
Source: WIFO calculations. –  15  – 
    
ICT expenditures amounted to 5.7% of GDP in 2000, ranking fifth among EU countries. For the 
other ICT indicators, Germany ranks between 7th (hardware expenditures in the IT sector) and 
14th (mobile phone penetration).  
Germany’s average rank for the set of 16 indicators of future investment was 4.3 in 1990, and 
6.6 in 2000. This was the 3rd best position for 1990 and the 6th for 2000. While position 6, may not 
be a problem for a medium wage economy, it indicates a severe threat when the country 
involved has the highest wages. It is even worse if we look at the dynamics of the German 
position over time. Ranking countries according to changes in the sixteen individual indicators 
between the beginning and the end of the nineties reveals that Germany is in last place, 
behind France and Italy. This means that for most determinants of long-run growth, 
investment increased less than in other countries. 
We arrive at a similar result when we simply sum up the expenditures on research, education 
and information technologies to an artificial (and partly overlapping) quantitative indicator 
of "total future investment". For Germany these investments amounted to 11.3% of GDP in 
1992 - above the EU average and rank 6. The indicator has risen since then only to 12.8%, 
which in the year 2000 was rank 10. German total investment into future growth is now half a 
percentage point below the EU average and 4.6 percentage points below the top 3 
countries. Again, the dynamics are more telling: the increase in investment into the future is 
the second lowest (13th) of all EU member countries. 










1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Germany Top 3 EU USA
 
Source: WIFO calculations (note that expenditures may overlap between the 3 components of the indicator "total 
investment into the future"). –  16  – 
    
Summing up this section, Germany enjoyed the highest expenditures on research in 1980, 
which was necessary, given its position as the country with the highest wages. It fell down to 
rank 3 in research, to rank 6 for a set of 16 indicators of research input and output, education 
and ICT, from rank 6 to rank 10 for total investment into future growth. The deterioration of the 
relative position is even more dramatic if we focus on changes: in the nineties, Germany had 
the second lowest increase in "total future investment" (R&D + education + ICT expenditures) 
and ranked last, if the changes in the set of 16 indicators of future investment are calculated 
and countries are ranked according to these changes.  
6.  Low investment dynamics on top of an old, unsolved problem 
The unsatisfactory dynamics of investment into growth drivers in the nineties took place on 
top of a problem already analysed in the eighties. 





as a percentage of GDP
Business expenditure












as a percentage of GDP
IT expenditure
as a percentage of GDP
TLC expenditure










Share of ICT industries
1990 2000  
Remark: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance by Germany vs. the top 3 (Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden). 
German wages have been the highest of all European Union countries, while the economy 
has been specialised in medium tech, skill intensive industries. In comparison to the US, as well 
as to France, the share of high tech industries has been rather low. As is usual with "structural 
problems", one never knows at which point in time a problem becomes really binding, since –  17  – 
    
specialisation and excellence in current strengths may overshadow future problems for quite 
a while (see structural problems in Japan). Germany's gap in high tech industries was, for 
example, addressed in Gerstenberger (1990) Porter (1990), Schumacher et al. (1995), Klodt 
(1990 and 1996), Siebert (1997), and even earlier in Legler (1982), Legler et al. (1992), 
Schulmeister (1984), Aiginger (1986) and is repeated in European Commission (2002), which 
reports that surprisingly, Germany has "a revealed comparative disadvantage in high tech 
industries". 
Table 5: Indicators of  Germany’s high-technology gap  
1991 2000 2000/1991 1990 1999 1999/1990 1990 2000 2000/1990
Germany -0.96 -2.45 -1.49 13.80 18.50 4.70 23.47 24.82 1.36
France -0.58 0.07 0.66 16.20 23.90 7.70 22.83 25.17 2.34
Italy -0.82 -0.65 0.17 10.20 10.60 0.40 16.23 13.66 -2.57
Large 3 -0.79 -1.01 -0.22 13.40 17.67 4.27 20.84 21.22 0.37
Denmark 3.48 3.48 14.80 20.20 5.40 12.54 15.71 3.17
Finland -2.08 -2.55 -0.47 8.80 24.10 15.30 10.46 24.79 14.33
Sweden 0.40 16.00 27.90 11.90 17.18 27.35 10.18
Top 3 -0.84 0.47 1.50 13.20 24.07 10.87 13.39 22.62 9.23
EU -0.14 0.06 0.20 14.80 21.50 6.70 20.08 21.36 1.27
USA 2.30 2.39 0.09 32.70 38.30 5.60 26.46 30.27 3.81
Germany vs. EU -0.82 -2.51 -1.69 -1.00 -3.00 -2.00 3.39 3.47 0.08
Germany vs. Top 3 -0.12 -2.92 -3.00 0.60 -5.57 -6.17 10.07 2.21 -7.87
Germany vs. USA -3.26 -4.84 -1.58 -18.90 -19.80 -0.90 -2.99 -5.44 -2.45
Share of technology-driven industries
3 Technology balance
1 Share of high-tech exports
2
 
1 Receipts minus payments for patents/GDP; Source: Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2003, p.53. - 2 Source: 
OECD, Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 2001, p. 207. - 3 Source: WIFO calculations using EUROSTAT, SBS. 
The German deficit in the high-tech sector was not closed in the nineties; if anything it 
became larger, specifically since some of the northern European countries made additional 
inroads into high tech industries. Table 5 shows that the German deficit in the technology 
balance (the difference between patent receipts and outlays) increased to 2.45 % of GDP in 
2000 from 1% in 1991. France started from a similar deficit in 1990 and today enjoys a small 
surplus. The same switch from deficit to surplus is reported for the EU as a whole. The countries 
with the largest surplus today are Denmark and the US. 
The share of high tech industries in German exports rose from 13.8% to 18.5%. The export share 
of high tech sectors is thus still three percentage points lower than the EU average, 5 points 
less than in France and less than half of that in the US. The increase between 1990 and 1999 
was less than 5 points in Germany, as compared to 8 points in France and 12 and 15 points in 
Sweden and in Finland respectively. The definition of high tech industries used by the OECD 
includes several industries with information and communication technology. –  18  – 
    
A typology developed by Peneder (2001) is more favourable for Germany insofar as it 
includes the car industry and parts of the chemical industry under the label of technology 
driven industries. The share of technology driven industries in German exports increased from 
23.5% to 24.8%. This is higher than the EU average, though smaller than in France and in USA. 
Again, the dynamics are slower in Germany than in the three top European countries, in the 
US or in France. 
As to the reason why neither the high tech gap, which has been acknowledged for decades, 
nor the inadequate dynamics of investments into future growth have attracted more 
attention in the German discussion of today, we conjecture that the following considerations 
are of relevance: 
One reason may be that Germany's position with respect to the most popular indicator, 
namely research in % of GDP, is not really bad. Sliding down from first place to third place  
does look innocent at first glance, and the position for patents is even better. The problem lies 
in the dynamics: if research activity is stagnating or declining (relative to GDP), changes from 
traditional lines to new fields of research and to new technologies is very unlikely. Additionally, 
the German innovation system7 is institutions-based and not demand driven; the distance 
between basic research at universities and  laboratories in the private sector is much greater 
than in the US. Given such an innovation system and starting with a high-tech gap, the 
stagnation of research expenditures or a decline relative to GDP is specifically dangerous. 
Additionally, German unification demanded that many of the best university researchers 
assist in the strengthening of East German universities (Humboldt University), instead of 
focussing on internationalisation and firm oriented applications. 
The second reason is that Germany does not rank at the low end, but rather has moderate 
positions for the majority of other indicators8. What is easily overlooked is that the country with 
                                                       
7 For a characterisation of the German innovation system see Soskice (1997), "incremental innovation in high-quality 
products especially in engineering and chemicals", p. 76 or Porter (1990) "as strong as Germany is overall in research, 
it cannot match the US in inventiveness in new industries", p. 377. 
8 As an example for this see the evaluation of Germany by the European Commission in its annual report on the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, which in their country-specific part on Germany state: "The position of Germany in 
the knowledge-based economy continues to be relatively strong. R&D expenditures and the number of patent 
applications are well above the EU average and have both continued their upward trend. Internet access .... is 
relatively high as well ...." EU Commission (2003, p. 26). This evaluation definitely compares Germany with the EU 
average, but not with the leading countries, and it focuses more – albeit not alone- on the position of Germany in a 
specific year, rather than on the dynamics over time. Consequently, R&D, the high tech gap, and failure to achieve 
a top position are not seen as a very pressing problems (education is specifically addressed with reference to the 
PISA ranking). –  19  – 
    
the highest wages should be among the top countries for most of the indicators and that 
each new low cost competitor – specifically endowed with technical skills as are the 
European accession countries – forces a high-wage country to climb further up the "quality 
ladder". 
Thirdly, while theory does not give clear evidence as to whether the level or the change of 
investments is important to growth (perhaps it does lean somewhat towards the level or even 
stocks), the acceleration and deceleration of growth depends on the dynamics of 
investments. Being positioned in last place for the whole set of indicators and second to last 
for the quantitative indicator is clearly in line with the declining growth rates and gives a 
bleak forecast. 
A forth reason for distracting attention away from underinvestment into the growth drivers, 
may be the high quality of German exports, and the high German export surplus in general, 
specifically in skill intensive industries. What is forgotten is that neither the overall surplus, nor 
the skill intensity of current exports insures against the consequences of insufficient presence 
in high tech and high growth sectors for which ICT is a prominent example. The new 
competitors in central and eastern European countries are specifically well trained in 
engineering, and efficient in small incremental innovation, using mechanical and increasingly 
electronic skills. On the policy front, German excellence in medium tech industries has led to 
a German initiative to shift European attention towards policies in which Germany is 
specialised (“German industries”), instead of enforcing the EU policy, to make Europe the 
most competitive economy of the world. Such a strategy includes, specifically for the country 
with the highest wages, a rising share of high-tech and high-growth industries. 
A final reason might be that the low dynamics of investment in research, education and the 
diffusion of technology is not seen as the cause of low growth, but as the consequence of 
low profits and low tax revenues (and the resulting financial strain on private and public 
sources for these investments). However, independent of the dominant direction of causality 
– whether from investment to growth or from profits and government revenues to investment - 
a vicious circle of low investment and low growth now exists and has to be addressed by 
economic policy, specifically in a high-wage country. –  20  – 
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25-34 45-54 2000/1991 2001 1991 2001 2001/1991 1995 2000 2000/1995
Germany 85 83 2 19 21 22 1 5.50 5.30 -0.20
France 78 58 20 25 20 34 14 6.30 6.10 -0.20
Italy 57 39 18 20 45 48 3 4.80 4.90 0.10
Large 3 73 60 13 21 29 35 6 5.53 5.43 -0.10
Denmark 86 80 6 39 27 29 2 6.30 6.70 0.40
Finland 87 70 17 41 33 38 5 6.30 5.60 -0.70
Sweden 91 78 13 30 27 37 10 6.40 6.50 0.10
Top 3 88 76 12 36 29 35 6 6.33 6.27 -0.07
EU 73 56 17 29 20 31 11 5.54 5.39 -0.15
USA 88 89 -1 30 39 9 7.00
Germany vs. EU 12.00 26.57 -14.57 -9.85 0.82 -9.29 -10.10 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05
Germany vs. Top 3 -3.00 7.00 -10.00 -17.37 -8.00 -12.67 -4.67 -0.83 -0.97 -0.13
Germany vs. USA -3.00 -6.00 3.00 -9.00 -17.00 -8.00 -1.70
Expenditures on education
4 Secondary education by age group
of population
1
Tertiary education in workforce
3
 
1 Source: Education at a glance 2001; table A1.2; percentage of the population that has attained at least an upper 
secondary education. - 2 Source: Education at a glance 2001; table A2.1; ratio of tertiary graduates to the 
population at the typical age of graduation. - 3 Source: Education at a glance 2001; table A2.4; percentage of the 
population of 24 to 34 year olds that has attained a tertiary education. - 4 Source: Education at a glance 2001; 
expenditures on educational institutions from public and private sources for all levels of education, by source of 
funds. For Italy public sector only.) –  21  – 
    
7. Conclusions 
(1)  Germany’s economic performance during the nineties was disappointing. Growth in 
output and productivity was lower than in the eighties and the lowest in the European 
Union. Unemployment is high, debt has risen, budget deficits are at or above the level 
allowed by the Stability and Growth Pact. The trade balance is still positive, but the share 
of German exports in the world market has fallen by one fifth (from 10% to 8%).  
(2)  Analysing the reasons why Germany underperformed, many analysts refer to the triple 
hypothesis of the costly welfare state, expensive labour and insufficient labour market 
flexibility. This set of explanations extends to the consequences of German unification and 
the lost interest advantage due to the common currency. We acknowledge that these 
factors contributed to Germany’s current problems to a certain extent. What these 
analyses however overlook is that warnings pertaining to the long run sustainability of 
Germany's economic structure were raised long before German unification. These 
analyses revealed that the country with the highest wages was underrepresented in high 
tech industries. We add to this “common knowledge” the information that Germany did 
not increase its investment into determinants of future competitiveness. For a set of 16 
determinants of research input and output, educational attainment, ICT expenditures 
and ICT use, Germany ranked 3rd in 1990 and  6th in 2000, among all EU members. Ranking 
the changes in the indicators between 1990 and 2000, Germany places last (next to 
France and Italy). If, as an alternative, we simply add up expenditures on R&D, education 
and ICT, we find that Germany ranked 6th in 1992 and fell down to rank 10 of 14 EU-
member countries in 2000. Of all EU-member countries, the increase in "total investment 
into the future" is second lowest in Germany. 
(3)  Underinvestment into future growth is the missing link in the current analysis of poor growth 
performance in Germany. The evidence that cost increases are the most important 
cause of anaemic German growth is not convincing. Labour costs increased in the first 
half of the nineties, as did taxes. But the wage increase was compensated in the second 
half, giving Germany a position in wages and in unit costs that was not worse in 2000 than 
in 1990. Taxes are now exactly as high as the EU average, which of course constitutes a 
relative loss of a former cost advantage. There might be an additional effect, insofar as 
the high budget deficit may be seen as a signal of further increases or at least of the 
impossibility of decreasing the overall tax burden in the future. And there may be 
structural effects in taxes and expenditures which depress growth. But the high cost story is 
convincing only in association with the initial high cost position and with the importance –  22  – 
    
of low costs in an economy needing restructuring and lacking technological 
competitiveness in the high tech sector. 
(4)  The same qualifications are relevant to the impact of regulation. Germany’s product 
markets are less regulated, more competitive, and the liberalisation of network industries 
came faster and earlier than in other countries. Labour markets are more regulated, 
specifically regular contracts. And some “wrong” signals were sent in the nineties. 
Temporary contracts, which were heavily regulated at the start of the nineties, are now 
only slightly more regulated than in other countries. Germany grew with the same 
institutions faster than the European average over the course of four decades. It is the 
interaction of regulation with the high necessity for restructuring which makes labour 
market reforms pressing, and it is the combination of the highest cost position with 
underinvestment in high tech industries which is depressing growth in Germany. 
(5)  Germany shares the low growth and the underinvestment into future growth problems 
with the two other big continental economies. France places 12th in the performance 
ranking, Italy 13th and Germany 14th. This meagre performance is in line with the ranking 
for investment into the long-run determinants of growth. For the (level of) investment in 
growth drivers, Germany, France and Italy rank 6th, 7th and 9th. For changes in the growth 
drivers between the beginning and end of the nineties, France, Italy and Germany take 
the last three positions, with Germany “carrying the red lantern.” In quantitative 
expenditures ("total investment into the future" i.e. R&D, education, ICT), France was 4th, 
Germany 10th and Italy 12th in 2000, for the relative change between 1990 and 2000 
France was 12th and Germany 13th. This is in striking contrast to the top 3 countries 
(Sweden, Finland, Denmark), which excelled in economic performance and in the level 
and dynamics of investment into growth drivers. The relation between the dynamics of 
growth drivers and actual growth is theoretically expected and the empirical data are in 
line with this expectation. We do not claim that the similarity of the performance ranking 
and the ranking for the dynamics of investments is a proof of causality. There is also 
feedback from investment growth, and the interactions between growth drivers and 
other determinants of growth (cost side, demand management, regulation) should not 
be forgotten. Additionally, German unification plays an important role, as does the boom 
and bust of the construction sector. But the stagnation of investments into the future is the 
least acknowledged factor. 
(6)  It is very surprising that investment into future growth has been neglected in the German 
discussion as reason for low growth, specifically since the underrepresentation of high –  23  – 
    
tech sectors and the insufficiencies of the German education system 
(Bildungsgesellschaft) have been discussed for decades. Germany’s expenditures on 
research, education and information technologies are decreasing relative to those of 
leading European countries and even to the EU average. German unification may be 
responsible for this trend, in part by crowding out these expenditures directly, and partly 
by indirectly shifting attention to more pressing short run problems. But this should have 
increased the attention of economists and economic advisors to long-term determinants 
of growth. Being in the middle of the field is not enough; sliding down the ranking is fatal 
for an economy in which the highest wages are paid. 
(7)  The reason why many analysts focus on labour market reforms, on increasing labour costs 
and taxes, but pay no attention at all to the long run determinants of growth, is probably 
linked to the hope that if market inefficiencies are eliminated and costs are reduced, 
investments into research and new technologies will automatically blossom. But this may 
take a long time, since increasing flexibility and lowering costs in the short run decreases 
demand and increases uncertainty. The positive effect on supply will only materialise over 
the long run. We can hope that this long-run result may come earlier if expectations are 
very optimistic; a pro-active policy of stimulating research, education and the diffusion of 
new technologies could bridge this gap. –  24  – 
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